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INTRODUCTION
Down but not out, Lawrence Lessig has not rested since his
defeat in Eldred v. Ashcroft1 on January 15, 2003. In Eldred, the
Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act (“CTEA”),2 enacted October 27, 1998, is
constitutional as applied to existing works.3 Despite this setback,
Lessig has continued to wage war against the provisions of the
CTEA. His ongoing efforts include developing the Creative
Commons, an organization that simplifies copyright
relinquishment;4 promoting the “Public Domain Enhancement
Act,”5 a new bill to re-institute copyright renewal; and litigating
two new cases, Golan v. Ashcroft6 and Kahle v. Ashcroft,7 where
he challenges the constitutionality of the effects of the CTEA.8
This Note evaluates the policies and legal arguments of the two
new cases. After a brief discussion of the legal arguments, it
concludes that they are rather feeble and were properly dismissed
on summary judgment.9 But this is not the Note’s focus, because it
is not Lessig’s focus either. Instead, it concentrates on what really
interests Lessig: the policy questions he raises in his complaints.
1

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 105,
108, 203, 301–04). For more information on the CTEA, see infra Part I.A.
3
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.
4
See, e.g., Jason Krause, The Education of Larry Lessig, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2004, at 38.
5
Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003); see LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 248–49 (2004).
6
See Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004); First Amended
Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No. 01-B-1854).
7
See Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1127, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19,
2004); Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Kahle v. Ashcroft (C 04-1127
BZ), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml (last visited Mar.
27, 2005).
8
See Krause, supra note 4, at 40–41.
9
See Golan, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1218; Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at **8, 18.
2
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The Note inquires: Would Lessig succeed if the plaintiffs’ lawsuits
were based directly on their policy grievances, as opposed to
constitutionality arguments divorced from them?10 In particular,
this Note evaluates two claims directly encompassing Lessig’s
policy concerns, arguments that the effect of the CTEA is
unconstitutional because (i) the extended copyright terms are
overly burdensome on those who publish public domain works11
and (ii) the absence of renewal provisions results in works being
locked-up, regardless of the preferences of the copyright holders.12
Part I first recounts Congress’ stated rationale for the CTEA
and the Supreme Court’s explanations for upholding it in Eldred.
Next, it delineates some of the main arguments in support of
petitioners that failed to persuade the Court in Eldred. It will be
useful to consider what arguments have already failed when
evaluating the new arguments. Finally, Part I introduces the
plaintiffs of Golan and Kahle, and details their legal and policy
arguments. The legal arguments are quickly dismissed. Parts II
and III explore factual, legal, and policy considerations in favor of,
and in conflict with, each of the claims proposed above,
respectively. Part IV provides a few additional considerations
about the burden imposed by Eldred on future challenges of
copyright terms. The Note concludes that neither of the new
arguments will succeed.
The fairness claim that the CTEA is overly burdensome on
public domain publishers and that these publishers should not
suffer in order to give copyright holders a windfall will not be
effective because (i) takings law does not recognize the public
domain publishers’ injuries, (ii) there is insufficient reason to
10

This inquiry is worth making because in the wake of Eldred, a straight-forward
challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA will not persuade courts. In contrast, the
plaintiffs’ grievances are more compelling. A legal analysis of them is also useful
because it serves as a springboard for evaluating closely what would result from granting
the plaintiffs a remedy. See infra Parts I.E.1, I.F.1, respectively, for information about the
Golan and Kahle plaintiffs.
11
See infra Part I.E.1. The Golan plaintiffs are not just public domain publishers, but
individuals who rely on the public domain publishing for their artistic endeavors.
However the analysis is essentially the same; both are harmed from reliance upon shorter
terms.
12
See infra Part I.F.2.
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extend the application of takings law to compensate public domain
publishers, and (iii) the Supreme Court clearly was aware of the
consequences of the CTEA when it decided Eldred.13 There is also
evidence that the Court implicitly indicated its position that the
extension of copyright terms did not constitute a taking of the
property of public domain publishers.14
The proposed argument that works often get locked-up against
the wishes of copyright holders is also not persuasive given the
existence of various methods for copyright owners to renounce
their copyright (including notifying the Copyright Office of their
intent to abandon and participating in Lessig’s own Creative
Commons) and the voluntary measures by which copyright holders
can improve access to potential licensees (e.g., registration, update
of registration, and the recordation of transfers).15
I. THE CTEA: WHY CONGRESS ENACTED IT; WHY THE SUPREME
COURT UPHELD IT; FAILED CHALLENGES; NEW CHALLENGES
A. A Brief History of Pre-CTEA Copyright Term Lengths
Under the Act of March 4, 1909 (“1909 Act”),16 the maximum
term of protection was fifty-six years—an initial term of twentyeight years plus a renewal term of twenty-eight years.17 For works
in statutory copyright prior to 1978, the Copyright Act of 1976
(“1976 Act”)18 increased the renewal term to forty-seven years, for
a total term of seventy-five years.19 It also changed the term of
protection for works created in 1978 or later, based upon how the
work was classified. New works by a single author were accorded
a single term of protection equal to the life of the author plus fifty

13

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.2.
15
See infra Part III.
16
Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976) [hereinafter 1909 Act].
17
See id. ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81; 3 NIMMER, MELVILLE B. & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.08 (2003).
18
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 [hereinafter 1976 Act].
19
See id. § 304; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 9.08.
14
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years.20 Works made for hire and anonymous or pseudonymous
works were granted a term of seventy-five years following
publication, or one hundred years from creation, whichever expired
first.21
B. The CTEA
The main effect22 of the CTEA is to extend the duration of
copyright by twenty years.23 Copyright extension impacts nearly
all works24 that have not entered the public domain before the end
of 1997.25 As a result, with a very limited exception,26 no work
will enter the public domain during the twenty-year period
commencing on January 1, 1998,27 unless the copyright holder of a
work elects to voluntarily renounce his copyright.28
Congress asserted various rationales for the CTEA.29 First, in
1993, the European Union issued a directive requiring member
states to extend their copyright terms for the life of the author plus
20
See 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, §
9.10[A][1].
21
See 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(c); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, §
9.10[B].
22
For the complete provisions of the CTEA, see Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended 17
U.S.C. §§ 105, 108, 203, 301–04). In brief, the CTEA alters copyright term duration, the
rules governing the termination of transfers, the rights of libraries and archives to
reproduce works, and the voluntary negotiation of royalties for audiovisual works.
23
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04 (1998). The twenty-year extension covers (1) works
created after January 1, 1978 that are: (a) by a single author (§ 302(a)), (b) joint works (§
302(b)), or (c) anonymous, pseudonymous, or works made for hire (§ 302(c)); and (2)
works created before 1978 that are: (a) not published or copyrighted before 1978, but
published before December 31, 2002 (§ 303(a)), (b) still in their original copyright term
on January 1, 1978 (§ 304(a)), or (c) in their renewal term on January 1, 1978 (§ 304(b)).
24
The exception is a narrow category of works, those that were created but not
published or copyrighted by January 1, 1978, and thereafter not published by December
31, 2002. See id. § 303(a); Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 379–80 (2000); supra note 23.
25
See Jaime Davids, Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court
Decision, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 173, 174 (2003).
26
See supra note 24.
27
See Davids, supra note 25.
28
See infra Part III.A.
29
For a more thorough discussion of rationales in support of the CTEA, see Gifford,
supra note 24, at 386–90. See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206–07 (2003).

STRATTON

2005]

5/25/2005 4:09 PM

CHALLENGING THE CTEA, POST-ELDRED

899

seventy years, while directing them to grant non-member states
only a term equal to their respective domestic copyright terms, if
those are shorter than life plus seventy years.30 In response,
Congress expressed the importance of harmonization with the
EU,31 while emphasizing the significance of copyright to the
American economy.32 Second, Congress noted that it is necessary
to increase the copyright term to ensure the protection of the
creator and at least one generation of heirs, in light of increasing
life spans and parents having children later in life.33 Third,
Congress observed that the creative incentives of authors and
corporate copyright owners could be favorably enhanced by
allowing them to take advantage of “‘technological developments
[that] . . . have extended the commercial life of copyrighted
works.’”34 Fourth, Congress realized that since copyright holders
are often corporations rather than individual authors, “extended
protection for existing works will provide added income with
which to subsidize the creation of new works.”35 Finally, Congress
30

See Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 7–9 (1996) (With the “increasingly global nature of the
market for U.S. copyrighted works, . . . [u]niformity of copyright laws is enormously
important to facilitate the free flow of copyrighted works between markets and to ensure
the greatest possible exploitation of the commercial value of these works in world
markets for the benefit of U.S. copyright owners and their dependents.”).
32
Id. (“America exports more copyrighted intellectual property than any country in the
world, a huge percentage of it to nations of the European Union. In fact, intellectual
property is our second largest export with U.S. copyright industries accounting for
roughly $40 billion in foreign sales in 1994. . . . [C]ore copyright industries contribute
more to the economy and employ more workers than any single manufacturing sector,
accounting for more than 5 percent of the total U.S. workforce.”).
33
Id. at 10–11. Moreover, Congress observes that “both the Berne Convention and the
EU Directive have accepted the standard that copyright should protect the author and two
succeeding generations,” and concludes that “the majority of American creators
anticipate that their copyrights will serve as important sources of income for their
children and through them into the succeeding generation.” Id. at 10.
34
Id. at 11–13. More specifically, Congress asserts that “the likelihood that a work
will remain highly profitable beyond the current term of copyright protection has
increased significantly as the rate of technological advancement in communications and
electronic media has continued to accelerate. . . . [T]he additional income [that
technological advancement will produce] will increase existing incentives to create new
and derivative works.” Id. at 12.
35
Id. at 12–13 (“[E]xtended protection for existing works will provide added income
with which to subsidize the creation of new works. This is particularly important in the
case of corporate copyright owners, such as motion picture studios and publishers, who
31
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recognized that extended copyrights would be a powerful and
necessary incentive for private economic actors to preserve
existing works in digital form.36
Whether these ends are valid or constitutional, and whether the
benefits outweigh the harms, are issues that have been hotly
debated.37 These issues reached the Supreme Court in Eldred v.
Ashcroft.
C. The Eldred v. Ashcroft Decision
Lawrence Lessig brought the Eldred case on behalf of
publishers of works in the public domain.38 After losing at the
District Court level39 and in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia,40 the Court of Appeals denied him rehearing en banc.41
rely on the income from enduring works to finance the production of marginal works and
those involving greater risks (i.e., works by young or emerging authors).”).
36
Id. at 13 (“Because digital formatting enables the creation of perfect reproductions at
little or no cost, there is a tremendous disincentive to investing the huge sums of money
necessary to transfer these works to a digital format, absent some assurance of an
adequate return on that investment. By extending the current copyright term for works
that have not yet fallen into the public domain, including the term for works-made-forhire (e.g., motion pictures), the [CTEA] will create such an assurance by providing
copyright owners at least 20 years to recoup their investment.”).
37
See, e.g., Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, §
6 (Magazine), at 40; Davids, supra note 25; Gifford, supra note 24; infra Part I.D.
38
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003); see also Davids, supra note 25, at 183
n.48 (“Petitioners are individuals and businesses that rely on the public domain for their
creative work and livelihood. Lead petitioner, Eric Eldred, is a noncommercial publisher
of existing works and a creator of new derivative ones. He founded Eldritch Press, an
Internet based press that creates and stores copies of public domain works for the World
Wide Web. With [his] new technology[,] students and scholars are able to search the
texts in ways that are not possible in the printed version.”).
39
Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting summary judgment for
defendants), aff’d 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003). Specifically, summary judgment was granted on plaintiff’s claims that
“the CTEA violates the First Amendment,” “retrospective extension of copyright
protection is beyond Congress’s enumerated power under the copyright clause,” and
“retroactive extension of copyright protection violates the public trust doctrine.” Id. at 3–
4.
40
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J. dissenting in part). Judge
Sentelle argued in his dissent that the extension of existing copyrights was impermissible
under the Copyright Clause. Id. at 380–84.
41
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (7-2 decision
denying rehearing en banc).
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Lessig then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two questions:
“whether the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights exceeds
Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause;42 and whether the
CTEA’s extension of existing and future copyrights violates the
First Amendment.”43
The Supreme Court affirmed.44 In response to the first issue,
the Court held that Congress has the authority to extend existing
copyrights, even with the “limited Times” restriction.45 According
to the Court, extending a “limited” term for an existing copyright
does not necessarily alter its status as “limited.”46 Furthermore,
“[h]istory reveals an unbroken congressional practice of granting
to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term
extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed
evenhandedly under the same regime.”47

42
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science
. . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right to their . . .
Writings”).
43
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.
44
Id. (7-2 decision) (Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
45
Id. at 199–204.
46
Id. at 199 (“Petitioners’ argument essentially reads into the text of the Copyright
Clause the command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever ‘fixed’ or
‘inalterable.’ The word ‘limited,’ however, does not convey a meaning so constricted.
At the time of the Framing, that word meant what it means today: ‘confine[d] within
certain bounds,’ ‘restrain[ed],’ or ‘circumscribe[d]. . . .’ Thus understood, a timespan
appropriately ‘limited’ as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be
‘limited’ when applied to existing copyrights.”).
47
Id. at 200. “[T]he First Congress accorded the protections of the Nation’s first
federal copyright statute to existing and future works alike. 1790 Act § 1. Since then,
Congress has regularly applied duration extensions to both existing and future copyrights.
1831 Act §§ 1, 16; 1909 Act §§ 23–24; 1976 Act §§ 302–03; 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04.” Id.
at 200–01 (footnote omitted). Moreover, “early Congresses extended the duration of
numerous individual patents as well as copyrights” and “courts saw no ‘limited Times’
impediments to such extensions.” Id. at 201–02 (citations omitted). “Congress’
consistent historical practice of applying newly enacted copyright terms to future and
existing copyrights reflects a judgment stated concisely by Representative Huntington at
the time of the 1831 Act: ‘[J]ustice, policy, and equity alike forb[id]’ that an ‘author who
had sold his [work] a week ago, be placed in a worse situation than the author who should
sell his work the day after the passing of [the] act.’” Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
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Next, the Court examined whether the CTEA was a rational
exercise of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause.48 The
Court recounted Congress’ rationale for the CTEA,49 and in
“substantial” “defer[ence]”50 to Congress, found that the CTEA
was rationale,51 “however debatable or arguably unwise . . . [it]
may be.”52
After disputing the petitioners’ arguments at length,53 the Court
discussed the second issue and held that copyright extension under
the CTEA did not violate the First Amendment.54 The Court
prefaced its analysis with evidence that the Framers found the
copyright monopoly to be consistent with principles of free
speech.55 Then the Court explained how copyright law itself has
“built-in First Amendment accommodations,” such as the
“idea/expression dichotomy”56 and the “fair use”57 defense.58
48

Id. at 204–08.
For Congress’ rationale, see supra text accompanying notes 29–36.
50
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204–05 (“‘[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in order
to give the public appropriate access to their work product.’”) (quoting Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
51
Id. at 204–08 (“The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes,
judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s domain.”).
52
Id. at 208. For arguments against the CTEA, see infra Part I.D.
53
Id. at 208–22. For a detailed account of petitioners’ arguments and the Court’s
responses, see infra Part I.D.1.
54
Id. at 218–21.
55
Id. at 219 (“The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time.
This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are
compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, [for the Framers,] copyright’s purpose
[was] to promote the creation and publication of free expression.”).
56
Copyright protects the creator’s expression, but not the underlying ideas. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2004) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
57
The statutory provision for the “fair use” defense states that expression may be used
“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . . . .” See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004); see
also Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985)
(explaining that the “[§ 107] listing was not intended to be exhaustive” and identifying
the following four factors as particularly relevant (but not exclusive) in determining
whether use was fair: “(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
49
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Finally, the Court pointed out that the CTEA itself has an
infringement exception for certain works that are not widely
available.59
D. The Arguments in the Supreme Court’s Eldred Opinion
In addition to analyzing the Supreme Court’s holding in
Eldred, it will be useful also to review the numerous and varied
arguments that the Supreme Court addressed in Eldred.60 This is
important because the arguments and proposed arguments of
Golan and Kahle should not only be evaluated on their merits,61
but also considered in reference to the arguments already made and
judged.62
1. Petitioners’ Arguments
The Supreme Court rejected the following arguments by the
petitioners:
(1) When applied to existing copyrights, repeated extensions
consisting of “limited Times” effectively result in
perpetual copyrights.63
work as a whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work”).
58
537 U.S. at 219–20.
59
Id. at 220 (The CTEA “allows libraries, archives, and similar institutions to
‘reproduce’ and ‘distribute, display or perform in facsimile or digital form’ copies of
certain published works ‘during the last 20 years of any term of copyright . . . for
purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research’ if the work is not already being
exploited commercially and further copies are unavailable at a reasonable prices.”)
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2004)). Congress, in enacting the provision, sought to
balance (i) the ability of libraries and other nonprofit institutions to preserve and make
available to patrons (for limited noncommercial uses), copyright material that is not
reasonably attainable, with (ii) the concern of copyright holders that such an exemption
non intrude upon their own commercial opportunities. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 18 (1996).
60
This Note does not purport to offer an exhaustive and detailed account of every
argument in Eldred, but a brief summary of the most significant ones discussed in the
Court’s opinion.
61
See infra Parts II–III.
62
See infra Part III.
63
537 U.S. at 208 (“Petitioners contend that even if the CTEA’s 20-year term
extension is literally a ‘limited Tim[e],’ permitting Congress to extend existing
copyrights allows it to evade the ‘limited Times’ constraint by creating effectively
perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions.”). In response, the Court observed that

STRATTON

904

5/25/2005 4:09 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:893

(2) Extension of existing copyrights violates the requirement
of “originality,” because nothing “original” is secured by
granting a longer term to a work already created.64
(3) Copyright extension does not “promote the Progress of
Science” when applied to works that have already been
created.65 Instead of stimulating new works, it merely
results in a windfall to authors.66
(4) Under the Copyright Clause, “Congress may grant to an
‘Autho[r]’ an ‘exclusive Right’ for a ‘limited Tim[e],’ but
only in exchange for a ‘Writin[g].’”67 An extension of
“[n]othing before this Court warrants construction of the CTEA’s 20-year term extension
as a congressional attempt to evade or override the ‘limited Times’ constraint. . . .
[P]etitioners fail to show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally significant threshold
with respect to ‘limited Times’ that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did not.” Id. at 209–
10.
64
Id. at 210–11 (Relying on the Court’s holding in Feist that there is not copyright
protection for “‘a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking
or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent,’ . . . petitioners urge that even if a work is
sufficiently ‘original’ to qualify for copyright protection in the first instance, any
extension of the copyright’s duration is impermissible because, once published, a work is
no longer original.”) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991)).
The Court replied that Feist “addressed the core question of
copyrightability, i.e., the ‘creative spark’ a work must have to be eligible for copyright
protection at all[,] . . . [but it] did not touch on the duration of copyright protection. . . .
The decision did not construe the ‘limited Times’ for which a work may be protected, and
the originality requirement has no bearing on that prescription.” Id. at 211.
65
Id. at 211–12 (“Petitioners maintain that the preambular language [in the Copyright
Clause, conferring upon Congress the ‘Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science,’]
identifies the sole end to which Congress may legislate; accordingly they conclude, the
meaning of ‘limited Times’ must be ‘determined in light of that specified end.’”) (quoting
Brief for Petitioners at 19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618)). The
Court acknowledges that the Copyright Clause acts as a “limitation,” but responds that “it
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright
Clause’s objectives.” Id. at 212. The Court also declares that “Congress’ unbroken
practice [of adjusting copyright terms for both future and existing works] since the
founding generation . . . overwhelms petitioners’ argument that the CTEA’s extension of
existing copyrights fails per se to ‘promote the Progress of Science.’” Id. at 213–14.
66
Id. at 211–12. The Court refutes this conclusion, explaining that various rationales
have been cited for the CTEA that “provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the
CTEA ‘promote[s] the Progress of Science.’” Id. at 213. For Congress’ rationale, see
supra text accompanying notes 29–36.
67
Id. at 214. “Congress’ power to confer copyright protection, petitioners argue, is
thus contingent upon an exchange: The author of an original work receives an ‘exclusive
Right’ for a ‘limited Tim[e]’ in exchange for a dedication to the public thereafter.” Id.
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existing copyrights in exchange for nothing violates this
quid pro quo requirement.68
(5) Congressional enactments pursuant to the Copyright
Clause should be subject to heightened judicial review.69
(6) “[T]he CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech
that fails heightened judicial review under the First
Amendment.”70
2. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion
Additional arguments were raised in dissenting opinions.
Justice Stevens argued:
(1) Fairness dictates that the public’s bargain with authors
should not be retroactively changed, unless the public is
compensated for the taking.71

68

Id. The Court objects to petitioner’s characterization of the Copyright Clause’s quid
pro quo. Id. The patent cases describing a quid pro quo are distinguishable because
“patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange.” Id. at 216. Nevertheless,
“[g]iven the consistent placement of existing copyright holders in parity with future
holders, the author of a work created in the last 170 years would reasonably comprehend,
as the [benefit] offered her [as inducement for creation], a copyright not only for the time
in place when protection is gained, but also for any renewal or extension legislated during
that time.” Id. at 214–15.
69
Id. at 217–18. “Specifically, petitioners ask [the Court] to apply the ‘congruence and
proportionality’ standard described in cases evaluating exercises of Congress’ power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. The Court declines to use that standard,
stating that the Court has “never applied that standard outside the § 5 context; it does not
hold sway for judicial review of legislation enacted, as copyright laws are, pursuant to
Article I authorization.” Id. at 218.
70
Id. The Court “rejects petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny
on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and
safeguards.” Id. at 218–19. For the Court’s analysis of copyright’s built-in First
Amendment protections, see supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
71
Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a
patent, the Government as a representative of the public sought to modify the bargain by
shortening the term of the patent in order to accelerate public access to the invention.
The fairness considerations that underlie the constitutional protections against ex post
facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts would presumably disable
Congress from making such a retroactive change in the public’s bargain with an inventor
without providing compensation for the taking. Those same considerations should
protect members of the public who make plans to exploit an invention as soon as it enters
the public domain from a retroactive modification of the bargain that extends the term of
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(2) Congress can act under the Copyright/Patent Clause only
to encourage new works or advance the public domain;72
extending existing copyrights achieves neither of these
goals.73
(3) The history of retroactive extensions of existing patents
and copyrights is “replete with actions that were
unquestionably unconstitutional.”74
Despite the
majority’s contention that “[h]istory reveals an unbroken
congressional practice of granting to authors of works
with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions,”75
“history is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the
Sonny Bono Act.”76 Moreover, the Court is responsible
the patent monopoly.”). But cf. supra note 68 (discussing the Court’s rejection of
petitioners’ quid pro quo argument).
72
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We have recognized that these
twin purposes of encouraging new works and adding to the public domain apply to
copyrights as well as patents. Thus, with regard to copyrights on motion pictures, we
have clearly identified the overriding interest in the ‘release to the public of the products
of [the author’s] creative genius.’”) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)). “And, as with patents, we have emphasized that the
overriding purpose of providing a reward for authors’ creative activity is to motivate that
activity and ‘to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.’” Id. at 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). But cf.
supra notes 65–66 (summarizing the Court’s response to petitioners’ claim that the
CTEA does not “promote the Progress of Science”).
73
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead, “[e]x post facto
extensions of copyrights result in a gratuitous transfer of wealth from the public to
authors, publishers, and their successors in interest.” Id. at 227 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, “Congress passed private bills
either directly extending patents or allowing otherwise untimely applicants to apply for
patent extensions for approximately 75 patents between 1790 and 1875. Of these 75
patents, at least 56 had already fallen into the public domain.” Id. at 235 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In light of the Court’s pronouncement that “‘Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available[,]’” this “repeated
practice [of extending patent terms] was patently unconstitutional [and it] completely
undermines the majority’s reliance on this history as ‘significant.’” Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966)).
75
Id. at 200; see also id. at 200–04 (detailing the history of extending term lengths on
existing copyrights and patents, and Congress’ policy for doing so).
76
Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The 1790 Act “does not provide support for the
proposition that Congress can extend pre-existing federal protections retroactively. . . .
[The] Act created, rather than extended, copyright protection.” Id. at 231–32 (Stevens, J.,
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for invalidating an unconstitutional practice, no matter
how long Congress has acted invalidly.77
(4) Though copyright extension may encourage restoration
and digitalization of old films, this does not validate
extension of all existing copyrights.78 This justification is
invalid because it does not relate to the encouragement of
new works, any original expression could be copyrighted
without the CTEA, the preservation rationale applies
equally to works already in the public domain, and
wholesale extension far overreaches the limited goal of
film restoration.79
3. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that the CTEA
lacks the required rationality because it regulates expression and it
is “not pure economic regulation.”80 He described the harms that
the CTEA presents,81 and disputed the alleged benefits.82
dissenting). Nor should significance be attached to the 1831 Act. Id. at 236 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). “Congress based its authority to pass the amendment on . . . [the] sweat-ofthe-brow view of copyright, [which] was emphatically rejected by this Court in 1834 in
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. [591,] 661, 8 L.Ed. 1055.” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). “In
1861, Congress amended the term of patents . . . . This change was not retroactive, but
rather only applied to ‘all patents hereafter granted.’” Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In sum, history reveals not only the existence of retroactive extensions, but varied
practices, some of which were “unquestionably unconstitutional.” Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, “history is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the [CTEA].”
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77
Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cites INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 103 (1983), for the proposition that “the fact Congress has repeatedly acted on a
mistaken interpretation of the Constitution does not qualify our duty to invalidate an
unconstitutional practice when it is finally challenged in an appropriate case.” Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 239–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80
Id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is no need in this case to characterize
[the] review as a search for ‘“congruence and proportionality,”’ or as some other
variation of what this Court has called ‘intermediate scrutiny’ . . . . Rather, it is necessary
only to recognize that this statute involves not pure economic regulation, but regulation
of expression, and what may count as rational where economic regulation is at issue is
not necessarily rational where we focus on expression—in a Nation constitutionally
dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning, and culture.” The
CTEA does not meet this standard because “the significant benefits that it bestows are
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a) Harms
(1) Although “only 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75
years old retain commercial value,” the twenty-year
extension will result in several billion dollars extra in
royalties for the holders of these 2% of existing
copyrights, at the expense of the American public.83 The
windfall accrues mostly to the copyright holders of works
that have already earned “many billions of dollars” in
royalties.84 The result is that “unnecessarily high prices
will unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic works.”85
(2) For an additional twenty years, one seeking to use or
reproduce a copyrighted work will have to seek
“[T]he
permission from the copyright holder.86
permissions requirement can inhibit or prevent the use of
old works (particularly those without commercial
value) . . . because it may prove expensive to track down
or to contract with the copyright holder. . . .”87
“[H]istorians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database
operators, and researchers of all kinds” will be prevented
from using copyrighted works of little or no commercial

private, not public; . . . it threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that the
Copyright Clause embodies; and . . . it cannot find justification in any significant Clauserelated objective.” (citations omitted)). But see id. at 205 n.10 (The Court rejects Justice
Breyer’s heightened standard: “The novelty of the ‘rational basis’ approach he presents is
plain. Rather than subjecting Congress’ legislative choices in the copyright area to
heightened judicial scrutiny, we have stressed that ‘it is not our role to alter the delicate
balance Congress has labored to achieve.’ Congress’ exercise of its Copyright Clause
authority must be rational, but Justice Breyer’s stringent version of rationality is
unknown to our literary property jurisprudence.”) (citations omitted).
81
Id. at 248–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at 254–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83
Id. at 248–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing figures from Edward Rappaport, CRS
Report for Congress, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values (1998)
[hereinafter CRS Report]).
84
Id. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing CRS Report, supra note 83, at 16).
85
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer presents evidence that works such as
novels are cheaper when they come out of copyright. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
CRS Report, supra note 83, at 3).
86
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 250 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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value.88
Moreover, the infringement exception for
libraries and archives89 will not be sufficient to remedy
these permissions-related harms because its coverage is
too limited and the “reasonable investigation”
requirement is too vague.90
b) Refutation of Claimed Benefits
(1) The additional incentives to an author from an extension
from life-plus-fifty years to life-plus-seventy years are
meaningless because (i) a creator cannot reasonably
expect to create a work that will still be earning money
during those final twenty years91 and (ii) royalties that far
in the future, discounted to present value, are almost
worthless anyways.92 In fact, when discounting is taken
88

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer observes that although permission costs of
copyright law are inevitable, they are “dramatically increase[d]” with the CTEA. Id. at
251 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “The older the work, the less likely it retains commercial
value, and the harder it will likely prove to find the current copyright holder. The older
the work, the more likely it will prove useful to the historian, artist, or teacher.” Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
89
See 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2004); supra note 59 (description of statute).
90
537 U.S. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The exemption] applies only where the
copy is made for the special listed purposes; it simply permits a library (not any other
subsequent users) to make ‘a copy’ for those purposes; it covers only ‘published’ works
not ‘subject to normal commercial exploitation’ and not obtainable, apparently not even
as a used copy, at a ‘reasonable price’; and it insists that the library assure itself through
‘reasonable investigation’ that these conditions have been met. What database proprietor
can rely on so limited an exemption—particularly when the phrase ‘reasonable
investigation’ is so open-ended and particularly if the database has commercial, as well as
noncommercial, aspects?”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)).
91
Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“No potential author can reasonably believe that he
has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive commercially long
enough for the copyright extension to matter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2%
of all copyrights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more
(a typical pre-extension copyright term)—must be far smaller.”) (citing CRS Report,
supra note 83, at 7).
92
Id. at 254–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] 1% likelihood of earning $100 annually
for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents today.”)
(citing Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 5–7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123
S.Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618)). But see id. at 207 n.15 (“Justice Breyer urges that the
economic incentives accompanying copyright term extension are too insignificant to
‘mov[e]’ any author with a ‘rational economic perspective.’ Calibrating rational
economic incentives, however, . . . is a task primarily for Congress, not the courts.
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into consideration, the CTEA produces a period of
protection that is worth more than 99.8% of perpetual
protection—a result “difficult to square with the
Constitution’s insistence on ‘limited Times.’”93 Most
importantly, with respect to works already created, “the
statute creates no economic incentive at all.”94
(2) The argument that uniformity with European copyright
terms justifies the CTEA is weak because the statute does
not create uniformity “with respect to the lion’s share of
the economically significant works that it affects—all
works made ‘for hire’ and all existing works created prior
to 1978.”95 Moreover the benefits of partial uniformity
are exceedingly thin.96 Because discounting for present
value minimizes the value of future royalties, few authors
will decide where to publish based the additional twenty
years protection.97
(3) Although there may be circumstances where a longer term
will give publishers and movie studios incentives to
restore old works, this concern does not permit Congress
to extend terms.98 This is because the Copyright Clause
Congress heard testimony from a number of prominent artists [including Quincy Jones,
Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos Santana]; each expressed the belief that the
copyright system’s assurance of fair compensation for themselves and their heirs was an
incentive to create.”).
93
Id. at 255–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for George A. Akerlof). But see id.
at 209 n.16 (In response to Justice Breyer, the Court observes: “It is doubtful . . . [that
the] architects of our Nation, in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription, thought in
terms of the calculator rather than the calendar.”).
94
Id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95
Id. at 257–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “With respect to those works the American
statute produces an extended term of 95 years while comparable European rights in ‘for
hire’ works last for periods that vary from 50 years to 70 years to life plus 70 years. . . .
[Also,] the statute [does not] create uniformity with respect to anonymous or
pseudonymous works.” Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97
Id. at 259 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (responding to the argument that “because
uncorrected disuniformity would permit Europe, not the United States, to hold out the
prospect of protection lasting for ‘life plus 70 years’ (instead of ‘life plus 50 years’), a
potential author might decide to publish initially in Europe, delaying American
publication”) (citing Brief for Respondent at 38, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769
(2003) (No. 01-618)).
98
Id. at 260–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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“assumes an initial grant of monopoly, designed primarily
to encourage creation, followed by termination of the
monopoly grant in order to promote dissemination of
already-created works.”99 The Clause “assumes that it is
the disappearance of the monopoly grant, not its
perpetuation, that will, on balance, promote the
dissemination of works already in existence.”100
(4) Although it is urged that term extension benefits the
American entertainment industry, the Copyright Clause
does not sanction enhancing the copyright holder’s
monopoly power for the purpose of generating higher
corporate profits.101
(5) An increase in lifespan does not support term extension
because the “life” element of the 1976 Act’s life-plus-fifty
term already adjusts the term in response to this
phenomenon.102
E. Golan v. Ashcroft
1. The Plaintiffs and Their Injuries
The Golan plaintiffs are individuals and businesses that rely on
public domain works for commercial or artistic endeavors.
Lawrence Golan is a conductor who puts on free symphonic
concerts to promote classical music.103 Constrained by a very
limited budget and the prohibitive costs of renting sheet music for
copyrighted works, Golan depends on public domain works for his
orchestras.104 The twenty-year term extension under the CTEA has
prevented Golan from selecting various important twentieth
99

Id. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101
Id. at 262–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I can find nothing in the Copyright Clause
that would authorize Congress to enhance the copyright grant’s monopoly power, likely
leading to higher prices both at home and abroad, solely in order to produce higher
foreign earnings. That objective is not a copyright objective.”).
102
Id. at 263 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103
First Amended Complaint at 19, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo.
2004) (No. 01-B-1854).
104
Id. at 20.
100
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century works for performance by his orchestras.105 This result
unites the Golan plaintiffs.106 In interrupting the annual flow of
new works into the public domain and increasing the term lengths,
the CTEA will, for twenty years, deprive the plaintiffs of using
works they would otherwise have been able to use.107
Lessig argues that these deprivations are overly burdensome on
public domain beneficiaries. He documents the dramatic increases
in term lengths; presently, in part due to the CTEA, the
“historically maximum average term of 32.2 years [has been
tripled].”108 Until the 1976 Act, shorter maximum terms of
105

Id. at 21. “In particular, CTEA has effectively prevented Golan from selecting for
public performance works of several great American composers such as George
Gershwin and Aaron Copland, as well as works of great foreign composers such as
Prokofiev, Dmitri Shostakovich, Igor Stravinsky, Jean Sibelius, and Maurice Ravel.” Id.
106
Plaintiff Richard Kapp is a conductor and plaintiff ESS.A.Y Recordings is a record
label started and headed by Kapp. Id. at 4–5. The complaint alleges that “[b]efore CTEA
was enacted, Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings relied on the yearly natural progression of
copyrighted works into the public domain due to the expiry of the term. CTEA, however,
puts an end to this vital supply of public domain works, at least for 20 years.” Id. at 24.
Plaintiff Symphony of the Canyons is a not-for-profit community orchestra that cannot
afford the costs involved with performing copyrighted works. Id. at 28. Similar to Golan,
Kapp, and ESS.A.Y Recordings, Symphony of the Canyons has been injured by the
CTEA’s 20-year extension, which has “greatly harmed the anticipated supply of public
domain works for Symphony of the Canyons to perform.” Id. Plaintiff Ron Hall, d/b/a
Festival Films, sells public domain films and supplies public domain stock footage that is
used in television programs and films. Id. at 30. “Before CTEA was enacted, Festival
Films relied on the natural progression of copyrighted works into the public domain each
year due to the expiry of the term. Such progression into the public domain was vital for
Festival Films to offer ‘new’ titles of public domain works. CTEA, however, puts an end
to this vital supply of public domain works for 20 years.” Id. Plaintiff John McDonough,
d/b/a Timeless Video Alternatives International, preserves and distributes public domain
movies and television programs. Id. at 32. Because of the CTEA, McDonough cannot
rely on the “natural progression of copyrighted works into the public domain” to increase
his inventory; the CTEA “puts an end to [his] vital supply of public domain works for 20
years.” Id. at 33. Even worse is the possibility that because of the extra twenty years of
protection, early films, which were made on material that deteriorates rapidly, will be lost
forever if the copyright holder does not exist or intend to preserve the film. Id. at 34.
107
See id. at 18 (“In establishing their businesses and pursuing their creative endeavors,
Plaintiffs relied on the existence of [the] natural progression of works into the public
domain. Each year would bring ‘new’ public domain works that Plaintiffs could perform
or make available for the public. What CTEA does is to put an end to this natural
progression of works into the public domain for a 20-year period. . . . [N]o copyrighted
works will enter the public domain at all until January 1, 2019. . . .”).
108
Id. at 14 (“CTEA has now thus effectively tripled the historically maximum average
term of 32.2 years. After CTEA, all subsisting copyrights vesting before 1978 will
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protection and renewal requirements resulted in average copyright
terms that never exceeded 32.2 years.109 Since 1976, however,
terms have been extended and renewal requirements have been
eliminated.110
“These two changes together mean[] that
copyrighted works automatically receive the maximum copyright
term, whether or not the work continues to have any commercial
value.”111 Plaintiffs are unfairly burdened because they relied on
“[e]ach year . . . bring[ing] ‘new’ public domain works that [they]
could perform or make available to the public.”112
2. The Legal Argument and Its Dismissal for Failure to State a
Claim
Lessig argues that the CTEA is unconstitutional because it
creates a term so long that it can no longer be considered
“limited:”113
The difference between the value of a perpetual copyright
and the value of the CTEA term is inconsequential . . . .
The present extension will produce a copyright period of
protection that is worth more than 99.8% of the value of
protection in perpetuity, leaving less than .2% of the work’s
value for the public. Therefore, the Framers would have
viewed the terms set by the CTEA as effectively or
virtually perpetual.114

receive a 95 year term at a minimum; work created after 1978 will receive either a 95
year term, or a term lasting 70 years after the author’s death. The result is that the
average copyright term for all copyrighted works is now the maximum term—a term that
is itself staggeringly long.”).
109
Id. at 12.
110
See id. (“In 1976, Congress eliminated the renewal requirements for works created
on or after January 1, 1978. From that point on, corporate works received protection for
95 years, while works by natural authors were protected for 50 years after the author’s
death. Then in 1989, Congress eliminated the renewal requirement for any subsisting
copyrights vested before 1978. All subsisting works were then guaranteed a term of 75
years, whether or not the authors had any continuing interest in protection. . . . On
October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed CTEA into law. CTEA generally grants an
additional 20 years to the term of copyright.”).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 18.
113
Id. at 3–4.
114
Id. at 40–41.
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This argument is identical to one made by Justice Breyer in his
Eldred dissent, and specifically rejected by the Court.115
The documentation of harms caused by the CTEA116 is much
more interesting than the legal argument, which does not directly
encompass the harms detailed. The CTEA claim is weak and
correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim.117 Chief Judge
Lewis T. Babcock of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado held that the plaintiffs’ claim was foreclosed
by Eldred.118 “The Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft held that
the extension of the copyright term in the CTEA was
constitutional, in that it was not effectively or virtually perpetual,
despite the fact that the Petitioners there did not directly challenge
the time-span provided for in the CTEA.”119 Plaintiffs’ claim that

115

See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text. These harms are the basis of the
claim discussed in Part II, infra.
117
The CTEA count was dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Golan v. Ashcroft,
310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Colo. 2004).
118
Id. at 1218.
119
Id.
In Eldred, the Supreme Court ruled, on the Petitioners’ claim that Congress
exceeded its authority under the Copyright and Patent clause, that the CTEA
did not violate the constitutional requirement that copyrights endure for
“limited Times.” Although the Petitioners in Eldred did “not challenge the lifeplus-70-years’ timespan itself,” id. 537 U.S. at 193, 123 S.Ct. 769, the Supreme
Court approved the Court of Appeals determination—when addressing the
argument that Congress evaded the “limited Times” constraint by creating
effectively perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions—that “a regime of
perpetual copyrights ‘clearly is not the situation before us.’” Id. at 209, 123
S.Ct. 769 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 379). In support of this
determination, the Supreme Court noted that Copyright Extension Acts in 1831,
1909, and 1976, “did not create perpetual copyrights, and neither does the
CTEA.” Id. at 210, 123 S.Ct. 769. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the argument made by Justice Breyer in his dissent, and
advanced by Plaintiffs here, that the “economic effect” of the CTEA, which
allegedly creates a copyright term worth 99.8% of the value of a perpetual
copyright, makes the term “virtually perpetual.” Id. at 209 n. 16, 123 S.Ct. 769.
The Supreme Court indicated that “[i]t is doubtful that those architects of our
Nation, in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription, thought in terms of the
calculator rather than the calendar.” Id.
Id.
116
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the “Supreme Court expressly did not reach the question”120 is
incorrect; the Supreme Court’s opinion on the matter was clear.121
F. Kahle v. Ashcroft
1. The Kahle Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Brewster Kahle is the Chairman of the Board of
plaintiff Internet Archive.122 “Internet Archive’s principal activity
is to build an ‘Internet library,’ with the purpose of offering
permanent and free access for researchers, historians, and scholars
to works—including audio, books, films, websites, and software—
that exist in digital format.”123 It would like to include “‘orphan’
works—i.e., books that remain under copyright, but are out of print
and therefore not widely available to the public.”124
Plaintiff Richard Prelinger is the President of plaintiff Prelinger
Associates, Inc.125 (“Prelinger Archives”). Prelinger Archives
strives “to collect, preserve, and facilitate access to films of
historic significance that have not been collected elsewhere, or
made commercially available elsewhere. Included are films
produced by and for many hundreds of important U.S.
corporations, nonprofit organizations, trade associations,

120

First Amended Complaint at 3, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo.
2004) (No. 01-B-1854).
121
See supra note 119. The Golan plaintiffs wrongfully equate the Eldred petitioners
not expressly raising the issue with the Supreme Court not expressly reaching it.
122
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 3, Kahle v. Ashcroft (C 04-1127
BZ), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml (last
visited Mar. 27, 2005).
123
Id. at 3. “The archive has over 30 billion Web pages, archived from the beginning of
1996. It hosts over 33,705 audio, video, and texts-based works, available for free
download from its site. The Internet Archive also hosts 3,173 moving images, ranging
from graduate-level mathematics lectures to independent news and ephemeral films. The
archive’s text collection contains 21,633 public domain works, including the first 10,551
books digitized pursuant to a ‘Million Book’ project. Users have contributed 7,643 live
concert recordings, 1,043 studio recordings, and 213 radio programs to the audio
collection.” Id. at 5–6.
124
Id. at 3. Plaintiffs Kahle and Internet Archive note that while they wish to provide
access to “orphaned” works, they would acquiesce to individual copyright holders’
requests that their works not be included in the archive. Id. at 18.
125
Id. at 3–4.
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community and interest groups, and educational institutions.”126
“Prelinger Archives wishes to make . . . orphan films available to
patrons on the same basis as the archive’s public domain materials,
[but] the process of locating rights holders for many of these works
is too costly and uncertain.”127
2. The Plaintiffs’ Injuries
Lessig argues that the present “unconditional copyright
regime” injures the plaintiffs because it grants copyright protection
regardless of the copyright holder’s preferences.128 He continues:
“[T]he law129 has . . . produced an extraordinary ‘orphan class’ of
126

Id. at 3–4. “The collection, including [a] portion [that was] acquired by the Library
of Congress, currently contains over 10% of the total production of ephemeral films
between 1927 and 1987. . . .” Id. at 4.
127
Id. at 18.
128
See id. at 9–10 (“A conditional copyright regime limits copyright protection to those
who take affirmative steps to claim copyright protection. For example, a regime that
requires registration of a copyrighted work, or the deposit of a copyrighted work, or the
marking of a copyrighted work with copyright notice, or the renewal of the term of
protection, is a conditional regime. An unconditional copyright regime grants copyright
protection whether or not the author or his assigns takes any affirmative steps to claim
copyright protection. For example, a regime that grants protection whether or not the
work is registered, deposited, marked, or renewed, is an unconditional copyright regime.
In each instance, protection is automatic, regardless of the will of the author or his
assigns. . . . The consequence of requiring . . . affirmative steps to secure copyright
protection was that the overwhelming majority of published works either passed
immediately into the public domain (because they were never registered or notice was not
given), or passed into the public domain after a relatively short term of protection
(because their terms were never renewed).”).
129
See id. at 12 (“In 1976, Congress abolished any registration, deposit, or renewal
requirement for works created on or after January 1, 1978. These changes meant that the
grant of protection for copyright extended automatically to all works for the full term of
copyright, without requiring any affirmative actions by the author or his assigns.
Congress has retained a voluntary registration system. In 1988, Congress passed the
Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853-2861, which
prospectively eliminated the notice requirement, and also removed registration as a prerequisite for filing an infringement action for the works of foreign authors. Congress has
retained a requirement that U.S.-based works be registered before an infringement suit
based upon the work is brought. In 1992, Congress passed the Copyright Renewal Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 266, which indiscriminately renewed all copyrights dating
from January 1, 1964 to December 31, 1977. Though historical patterns suggest that no
more than 8–15% of the copyrights during that period would have been renewed,
Congress extended the protection of copyright to all subsisting copyrights even in the
absence of any expressed desire by the copyright owners to secure the benefits of an
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creative work—work that the author has no continuing interest to
control, but which, because of the burdens of the law, no one else
can effectively and efficiently archive, preserve, or build upon in
the digital environment for a term now reaching almost a
century.”130 The CTEA exacerbated this situation because it
“unconditionally extended by 20 years the term of all subsisting
copyrights, . . . regardless of any expressed desire by the copyright
owners to secure the benefits of an additional term.”131 It was also
the “first statute to extend the copyright term for works that had
not been filtered by a renewal requirement [(i.e. registered works
published between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1978)].”132
The Kahle lawsuit focuses on these works from 1964 to
1978.133 Lessig argues:
There is no continuing copyright-related interest in
continuing the protection of copyright for the vast majority
of this work. While [the burden of restricted access,
pursuant to an unconditional copyright regime,] may be
slight in the context of commercially viable works—since
additional term. Finally, in 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827-2828, which unconditionally
extended by 20 years the term of all subsisting copyrights, including those automatically
extended by the Copyright Extension Act, regardless of any expressed desire by the
copyright owners to secure the benefits of an additional term.”).
130
Id. at 1–2. “Whereas the traditional contours of a conditional copyright regime
produced, through the renewal requirement, a fresh record of copyright ownership, an
unconditional copyright regime guarantees no mechanism to identify the current or even
presumptive owner of copyrighted material. This makes subsequent reuse practically
impossible for the vast majority of uses that Plaintiffs would enable.” Id. at 13.
131
Id. at 12.
132
Id. at 14 (“For registered works published between January 1, 1923 and December
31, 1963, CTEA extended the term of any subsisting copyright by 20 years. But because
the average renewal rate for work published between 1923 and 1926 was just 15%, 85%
of the work originally copyrighted during that period had already passed into the public
domain. Thus, while CTEA extended the terms of subsisting copyrights, the filter of
renewal had already eliminated the burden of copyright regulation from the vast majority
of copyrights granted during this period. For registered works published between
January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1978, CTEA extended the term of subsisting
copyrights by 20 years. But because the Copyright Renewal Act had granted an
automatic renewal to all subsisting copyrights not yet in their renewal term, CTEA
extended the copyright term of a class of works of which, according to historical data,
85% would never have been renewed.”).
133
Id. at 15.
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the fact of commercial availability makes access possible,
and makes identifying the copyright owner relatively
easy—for the vast majority of works in this period that are
not currently commercially available, this unconditional
regime effectively orphans them. Internet based archives,
libraries, film restorers, and follow-on creators have no
viable or reasonable way to identify copyright owners for
this creative work. And with respect to this work, there is
no
copyright-related
benefit
from
abolishing
registration. . . . The result is that a vast number of
copyrighted yet no longer commercially valuable works sit
idle rather than enriching public knowledge.134
3. The Legal Arguments and Their Dismissal for Failure to
State a Claim
There are one First Amendment and two “limited Times”
arguments. According to Lessig, First Amendment scrutiny is
required because the change from a conditional copyright regime
to an unconditional one alters “the traditional contours of copyright
protection.”135 Freedom of speech has been burdened because
“even though historical data suggest that more than 85% of this
work would never have had its copyright renewed, the law has
automatically extended the term for all of this work by 67
years.”136
The first “limited Times” argument duplicates the argument
made in Golan.137 It alleges that the CTEA violated the Copyright
Clause’s “limited Times” requirement because the lengthened term
of protection granted by the CTEA is effectively perpetual.138
Under the conditional copyright regime, the average term was
134

Id. at 15–16, 18.
Id. at 19–20. Lessig backs up this statement by repeating the Supreme Court’s
holding in Eldred that “‘when . . . Congress has not altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.’” Id. at 19. “By
implication, [continues Lessig,] when Congress does alter ‘the traditional contours of
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny’ should be necessary.” Id. at 19.
136
Id. at 20–21.
137
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
138
Id. at 21–22.
135
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never longer than 34.1 years. Now the average term is 95 years for
corporate works.139
The second “limited Times” argument challenges the CTEA’s
constitutionality:
to the extent [it] extend[s] the terms of copyrights that have
not, and will not, be renewed. . . . The Court in Eldred did
not consider that every extension before CTEA applied to
works whose terms had to be renewed. CTEA was the first
statute to purport to extend the term of works that would
never be filtered by a requirement of renewal. This change
in a fundamental contour of copyright’s free speech
protections should lead the Court to reconsider its decision
in Eldred, and hold that within an unconditional copyright
regime, Congress has no power to extend the terms of
existing copyrights.140
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California dismissed all three claims
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).141 The First Amendment argument
was unsuccessful because Judge Chesney held that transition from
a conditional to an unconditional copyright regime did not alter the
traditional contours of copyright law.142 She first reviewed the
traditional contours discussed by the Supreme Court in Eldred—
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use exception143—and
discussed generally the Court’s observations on the compatibility
of free speech and copyright.144 She then distinguished the
139

Id. at 22.
Id. at 2, 25.
141
Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1127, 2004 WL 2663157, at **8, 18 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
19, 2004).
142
Id. at **16–18.
143
Id. at *16; see also supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court’s invocation of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use in Eldred).
144
Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at **16–17; see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003) (“‘[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.’”) (quoting Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)); id. at 221 (“The First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or to decline to make—one’s own
speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s
speeches. To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright’s
140

STRATTON

920

5/25/2005 4:09 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:893

registration, renewal, deposit, and notice requirements of the
conditional copyright regime as “formalities [that] do not alter the
scope of copyright protection, but merely determine the procedures
necessary to obtain or maintain such protection. Because changes
to requirements of this nature do not alter the substantive rights
granted by copyright, . . . [the CTEA] do[es] not alter the
‘traditional contours of copyright protection.’”145
The first “limited Times” argument failed for the same reason
it failed in Golan v. Ashcroft, namely that the Supreme Court’s
holding in Eldred foreclosed the claim.146
The second “limited Times” claim also was precluded by
Eldred: “The Supreme Court held in Eldred that Congress does not
violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment by extending
the copyright terms of existing copyrights.”147 The district court
held that whether Congress’ power to extend copyright terms is
affected by the change from a conditional to an unconditional
copyright regime (and whether this alters a fundamental contour of
copyright’s free speech protections) can only be determined by the
Supreme Court, which would have to reverse Eldred to decide for
the plaintiffs.148 Lacking authority to overturn Eldred, the district
court dismissed the claim.149
Lessig intends to appeal the Kahle decision to the Ninth
Circuit.150

built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them.”); id. (“[The
CTEA] protects authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation. Protection of
that order does not raise the free speech concerns present when the government compels
or burdens the communication of particular facts or ideas.”).
145
Kahle, 2004 WL 2663157, at *17.
146
Id. at *8 (citing Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217–18 (D. Colo. 2004));
see supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text (explaining why the Golan court rejected
the perpetual term claim).
147
Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192–94 (2003)).
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Stan. L. Sch. Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Kahle v. Ashcroft Case Page, at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml (last visited Jan. 15,
2005) (posting of Christopher Sprigman, co-litigator of Kahle v. Ashcroft, Dec. 3, 2004).
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II. FIRST CLAIM: THE CTEA IS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE THE
EXTENDED COPYRIGHT TERMS ARE OVERLY BURDENSOME ON
THOSE WHO PUBLISH PUBLIC DOMAIN WORKS
The legal arguments did not succeed in Golan and Kahle,
largely because the courts held that they were foreclosed by
Eldred.151 Although the legal arguments were dismissed on
summary judgment motions, Lessig raised interesting policy
concerns that were not part of the legal claims.152 Parts II and III
of this Note evaluate legal claims based on those policy arguments,
specifically that the CTEA is unlawful because (i) the extended
copyright terms are overly burdensome on those who publish
public domain works and (ii) the absence of renewal provisions
results in works being locked-up, regardless of the preferences of
the copyright holders.153 This Part will present arguments in favor
of, and in contention with, the first of these claims.
Lessig documents the adverse consequences that the CTEA
imposes upon businesses and nonprofit associations that rely upon
public domain works.154 In many cases, these groups will be
ultimately restricted from using works that, absent the CTEA, they
would have been able to use.155 Yet changes in law inevitably
cause economic harm to individuals, and not all of these harms
merit restitution.156 Two questions are thus raised: (1) Do the
public domain publishers have a claim for the damage to their
businesses? (2) Should there be a remedy for them? In resolving
these questions, Part II evaluates two possible bases for a legal
claim: the Fifth Amendment “Takings” clause and an economic
theory for reliance damages.

151

See supra Parts I.E.2 (Golan), I.F.3 (Kahle).
See supra Parts I.E.1 (Golan), I.F.2 (Kahle).
153
See Krause, supra note 4, at 40–41.
154
See supra Part I.E.1 (Golan plaintiffs); Brief for Petitioners at 3–7, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618) (offering specific examples of how the
Eldred petitioners will be harmed by the CTEA’s restriction on “their ability to build
upon and use content”).
155
Id.
156
See, e.g., Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.)
(“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”).
152
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A. Fifth Amendment “Takings” Clause Claim
Public domain publishers would be entitled to compensation if,
as applied to pre-existing works, the CTEA constitutes a taking.157
For there to be a takings claim, private property must be taken for
public use, without the payment of “just compensation.”158
Because there is no serious contention that such “just
compensation” has been made to public domain publishers,159 only
the former two issues require resolution: whether the public
domain publishers’ right to use works in the public domain
constitutes the kind of “private property” that the Fifth
Amendment governs, and whether term extension is for “public
use.”
1. Does the Right to Use Works in the Public Domain
Constitute Private Property?
Professor Eben Moglen has opined that “in all justice[,] the
Supreme Court would be compelled to agree that you cannot take
the reversioner’s interest in the public domain without
payment.”160 Noting their common law origins, he compares
copyrights to estates, and observes that copyrights are really just “a
conveyance for term of years or a life interest plus a term of years,
with . . . reversion to the public domain.”161 He then cites Hawaii
157
A taking is a term of art defined in various Supreme Court cases. This section will
evaluate those cases relevant to the public domain publishers’ interests in works with
terms set to expire, then extended. For the benefit of the reader, a general definition for a
taking is: “[t]he government’s actual or effective acquisition of private property either by
ousting the owner or by destroying the property or severely impairing its utility. There is
a taking of property when government action directly interferes with or substantially
disturbs the owner’s use and enjoyment of that property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2004).
158
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation”).
159
See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1419 (2003) (holding that
“the ‘just compensation’ required by the Fifth Amendment is measured by the property
owner’s loss rather than the government’s gain”). Clearly, public domain publishers
experience a loss when copyright terms are extended for twenty years.
160
See Symposium, Panel II: Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 784 (2003).
161
See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation at 14, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618).
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Housing Authority v. Midkiff162 for the principle that “legislative
alteration of such estates that destroys or limits the reversionary
interest in real property in order to achieve redistribution between
private parties is ‘public use’ within the meaning of the Takings
Clause, and is constitutional if compensated.”163
Although Moglen’s analysis demonstrates that a reversionary
interest in real property may satisfy the Taking Clause’s “private
property” requirement, and private redistribution can constitute
“public use,” Moglen fails to demonstrate whether the Midkiff
holding can be extended to personal property. Moreover, he fails
to establish that use of public domain works constitutes any sort of
property. Because it is not property, it is outside the scope of the
Takings Clause.164
The Supreme Court held in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.165
that intellectual property rights constitute a “property right [that] is
protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”166 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court observed that “‘[p]roperty
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.’”167 The Court held that “to the extent that Monsanto has an
interest in its . . . data cognizable as a trade secret property right
under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Takings
Clause . . . .”168 Unlike the Missouri law referenced in Monsanto
that treats trade secrets as property, there is no analogous law that
defines the public’s interest in public domain works as a property

162

467 U.S. 229 (1984).
See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation at 14; see also Midkiff,
467 U.S. at 241 (explaining that “public use” is satisfied if the taking is “rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose”).
164
See supra note 158.
165
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 469 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (trade secrets).
166
In addition, the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the Takings Clause protects
an interest in a copyright. See Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983); Practice
Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997).
167
Monsanto, 469 U.S. 986, 1001 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972))).
168
Id. at 1003–04 (emphasis added).
163

STRATTON

924

5/25/2005 4:09 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:893

right. It may be a right, but it is not a property right. Therefore,
takings law is inapplicable.
Moglen’s takings analysis suffers from an additional flaw. He
neglects to analyze whether the public domain publishers’ interests
were harmed enough to invoke the Takings Clause. Even though
the CTEA will be very costly for those wishing to use works that
but for the extension would have been in the public domain,169 in
an additional twenty years the works will ultimately be exploitable
by public domain publishers. Under the sliding scale170 used by
the Court, it would seem unlikely that enough value has been
removed by the twenty-year extension for there to be a taking.171
Even if the petitioners’ interest was characterized alternatively as a
complete loss of business opportunity for a temporary period,172
the CTEA still would not result in a taking because while certain
works remain protected, there would still be a large body of usable
works in the public domain.173

169
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No.
01-618) (estimating that costs of the CTEA will be $317,000,000 annually for royalties,
in addition to the costs of denied access to the vast majority of works that are not
commercially valuable).
170
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497
(1987) (explaining that “our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value
that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property . . .”);
Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (stating that “the extent of the
diminution . . . [w]hen it reaches a certain magnitude” warrants compensation).
171
See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978)
(citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), for the proposition that a “75%
diminution in value caused by zoning law” did not qualify as a taking, and Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), for the ruling that an 87 1/2 % diminution in value did
not qualify either) (Note that these high percentages are for regulatory takings, not
physical occupation. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 434-35 (1982) (holding that any permanent physical occupation is a taking)). Penn
Central was a landmark takings case, introducing the following as the test factors for
takings: “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[,] . . . the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[,
and] . . . the character of the governmental action.” Id.
172
See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1418–19 (2003) (stating that
“compensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken . . . even though that use is
temporary” and applying this reasoning to subverted interest payments).
173
The argument that nearly all works that would have been in the public domain
without the CTEA have been taken for 20 years ignores the vast majority of works still
exploitable by public domain publishers. This argument is invalid because it is overly
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2. Additional Considerations on the Takings Issue Provided
by the Eldred Decision
The above analysis of takings law reveals that a court could not
find that a twenty-year term extension applied to works already
created constitutes a taking.174 That plaintiffs’ interests do not
constitute private property is fatal.175
Two additional
considerations should also dissuade a court from concluding that a
remedy is owed to public domain publishers: (1) The Eldred Court
understood that the CTEA would injure public domain publishers
and it upheld the statute nonetheless; (2) There is reason to believe
that the Supreme Court implicitly decided the takings issue in
Eldred.
First, the Supreme Court in Eldred was aware of the harm that
the CTEA would impose on public domain publishers, and this did
not prevent it from upholding the constitutionality of the CTEA.
Justice Stevens was outspoken about the fairness implications of
the CTEA. According to Stevens, “The fairness considerations
that underlie the constitutional protections against ex post facto
laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts would
presumably disable Congress from making such a retroactive
change in the public’s bargain with an inventor without providing
compensation for the taking.”176 Nevertheless, the Court upheld
the CTEA.
Second, some legal scholars postulate that the Supreme Court
implicitly decided the takings issue. They suggest that Eldred did
not circumvent takings issues, but instead elucidated the Supreme
Court’s opinion on the issue. According to Professor Richard A.
Epstein, “[T]oday all efforts to stop government giveaways on
constitutional grounds seem to have come to a dead-end after the
Supreme Court used in essence a rational basis test to sustain a
grand legislative giveaway under the [CTEA].”177 Similarly,
narrow—it would be similar to arguing that if a zoning law prohibits use of 5% of your
land, the government is taking 100% of 5% of your property.
174
See supra Part II.A.1.
175
Id.
176
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177
See Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A Presumptive Vote for the
Reliance Interest, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 79–80 (2003).
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Professor Eric R. Claeys observed that the Supreme Court was not
dissuaded from upholding the CTEA, despite the “serious takings
questions” it raised.178 Such inferences with regard to the Supreme
Court opinion may be persuasive to lower courts.
B. A Claim Based upon a Theory for Reliance Damages
1. Background: The Economics of Adjustments to the Law
Professor Richard A. Epstein has argued that when the
legislature contemplates a new law, it should be guided by a
“strong presumption” to “keep the legal framework constant.”179
This avoids unnecessarily interfering with the expectations of
private parties.180 It also protects against the substantial costs due
to the “time, expense, and uncertainty created by the development
and implementation of new legal rules.”181 Nevertheless, the high
costs an alteration to the law imposes upon the expectations of
private parties may be justifiable, particularly when marginal
benefits exceed marginal costs.182
2. Compensation for the Residual Risks of Change
The CTEA is a boon for copyright holders at the expense of
public domain publishers. Even if the CTEA is efficient, at
minimum, “justice and efficiency” dictate that the “residual risks
178

Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1549, 1650 (2003) (suggesting that the Supreme Court was not dissuaded from
upholding the CTEA as a result of the “serious takings questions” it raised).
179
Epstein, supra note 177, at 70.
180
Id. (“Private parties are thought to be better able to adapt to changes in the legal
order than governments are to anticipate the behavior of private parties. Therefore, the
risk of legal change is placed not on the parties who initiate the change but on those
whose expertise is said to allow them to anticipate any changes that might be made.”).
181
Id. at 72.
182
Id. at 71. In other words, it is insufficient to find merely that the benefits of a new
law outweigh its costs; this could have been the case with the previous law as well. For
example, consider copyright systems with terms of life plus 50 years and life plus 70
years; both are more beneficial than no copyright protection at all. Instead, it is necessary
to determine whether the marginal benefits of changing the law exceed the marginal
costs. If this condition is met, then the differential between total costs and benefits will
be greater for the new law than the previous law, and enacting the new law will be
economically sound.
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of change . . . ought to be borne in the first instance by those who
champion or initiate the change, and not those who are asked to
respond to it.”183 The winners (copyright holders) should be
obligated to compensate the losers (public domain publishers) for
the initial costs involved with adapting to the CTEA, and the actual
losses incurred in reliance upon pre-CTEA copyright terms.184
3. Compensation for Lost Profits
a) The “Virtuous Government” vs. the Self-Interested
Government
Whether public domain publishers should be compensated for
lost profits depends upon how legislators are characterized. In
Epstein’s “virtuous government,” legislators enact new laws only
if they are either Pareto185 efficient or Kaldor-Hicks186 efficient,187
and they are equally concerned about each individual’s welfare.188
If this characterizes the government that enacted the CTEA, then
there is no need to compensate public domain publishers for lost
profits caused by the CTEA.189

183

Id. at 72.
This stage of the argument does not yet contemplate compensation for lost profits.
Rather, it advocates reimbursement of costs such as those expended on preparing to
release new books or digitally improving a sound recording, neither of which can be
released.
185
In a Pareto efficient change, some parties are made better off, but none are made
worse off. E.g. Assuming only two individuals, A and B, a change is Pareto efficient if A
benefits from the change, and B’s welfare stays the same, or also improves.
186
A change is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the gains exceed the losses. E.g. Assuming
only two individuals, A and B, a change is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if A’s benefit is greater
than B’s loss.
187
Changes that are Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient meet the requirement that marginal
benefits exceed marginal costs, as set forth in Part II.A.2.a, supra.
188
See Epstein, supra note 177, at 73 (“[T]he virtuous government does not target
insular and isolated minorities, but rather treats the welfare of all its citizens equally.”).
189
See id. (With the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks tests, “[t]he distributional consequences
might be unpleasant in any individual case, but even that unhappiness would tend to even
itself out over the long-haul; the virtuous government does not target insular and isolated
minorities, but rather treats the welfare of all its citizens equally. In doing so, the
constant procession of sound overall legal innovations will leave, after the dust settles,
few if any losers behind.”).
184
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However, this could not realistically represent any government.
The best an optimist could hope for would be a situation that
Epstein neglects to discuss—the “virtuous but fallible
government.” This model acknowledges that even a “virtuous”
legislature would, either though lack of facts,190 negligence, or
simple mistake, commonly but inadvertently enact laws that meet
neither of the efficiency tests—even though it seeks to enact only
efficient laws and to distribute benefits equally. If the public
domain publishers could prove that the CTEA is neither Pareto nor
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, then compensation would be justified
under the “virtuous but fallible government” model.191
In contrast to the two “virtuous” governments is one in which
self-interest192 drives legislators to enact laws that are neither
Pareto nor Kaldor-Hicks efficient.193 When this occurs, the
“losers” of a change in law have a justifiable claim for relief, just
as with a “virtuous but fallible government.” However, with a
190

See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and
Policy?, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 14 (2003–2004) (“Economic input should . . . be
sought when copyright laws are amended. Had the US Congress, for example, sought
impartial advice from economists about the effects of copyright term extension before
enacting the CTEA, it is conceivable that economic arguments against it would have
persuaded some in Congress to oppose it.”).
191
The only exception would be if mistakes were evenly distributed by amount, or so
close that the administrative costs of remedying the inequalities would outweigh the
benefits to be distributed. However, this is unlikely. In the realm of copyright, for
example:
[m]ajor copyright firms are well-organized and well-funded. They typically
have a common interest in getting stronger legal rules from the legislature.
Hence, it may be a sound investment for them to lobby to achieve the
concentrated benefit a legislature can grant them. . . . [In contrast,] [c]ollective
action problems make it difficult for parties that will be negatively affected by
higher protection rules to organize effective resistance to copyright industry
lobbying. This mix of concentrated benefits and distributed costs is likely to
yield the best laws money can buy. The Copyright Term Extension Act . . . [is
a] widely recognized example[] . . . .
Id. at 9–10.
192
Epstein’s definition of self-interest is not entirely clear. He elucidates what he means
by self-interest when states that “[s]elf interest is a strong driver of individual behavior
outside of political institutions, and people do not check their personal passions and
inclinations at the door when they assume public office.” See Epstein, supra note 177, at
73–74. He later refers to “unpredictable changes bought by lobbying interests groups.”
Id. at 76.
193
Id. at 73–74.
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self-interested legislature, the “losers” also deserve relief even if
the law is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because the self-interested
government will not strive to distribute benefits equally over
time—instead it will reward the same benefactors over and over
again. This important difference in distribution, in addition to the
self-interested government’s predisposition to intentionally (as
opposed to merely negligently) adopt inefficient laws, guarantees
that the magnitude of the inequities will be significantly greater
with the self-interested legislature than the “virtuous but fallible
government.” As Epstein explains, this situation is particularly
harmful because private parties are compelled:
to bear the risk of changes that are [intentionally] socially
destructive, and to organize their operations and
investments in ways that resist the silliness of government
initiatives and programs. This anticipation is all the more
difficult when individuals have to foresee not only [what in
good-faith are expected to be] beneficial changes, but also
unpredictable changes bought by lobbying interest groups.
Compensation for losses induced by legal changes is one
possible alternative, which is however, very difficult to
implement with respect to general changes in the legal rule.
Another alternative is a limited form of grandfathering to
protect the reliance interests of those who acted under the
previous regime. Still a third possibility is [judicial
intervention] to strike down the changes to begin
with . . . .194
If a court were to conclude that the CTEA is neither Pareto nor
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or under the self-interested model, merely
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, Epstein’s reliance interest analysis would
provide an economic theory for giving public domain publishers
one of these remedies.
b) Is the CTEA Efficient?
Public domain publishers would merit compensation for lost
profits if they could prove that the CTEA is neither Pareto nor
194
Id. at 76. These remedies are also applicable to the inefficient changes made by a
“virtuous but fallible” government.
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Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Because the CTEA harms public domain
publishers, the CTEA is not Pareto efficient; therefore, it is only
necessary to determine whether it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Do
the benefits to the copyright holders, businesses that work with
copyright industries, and the U.S. government outweigh the costs
to the rest of society, particularly consumers, public domain
publishers, and potential derivative users?
i. Benefits
As noted by Congress, the copyright industries are a lucrative
source of income from foreign countries and are responsible for
more than 5% of the U.S. workforce.195 Although copyright term
extension means that U.S. consumers have to pay higher prices, a
substantial benefit accrues to Americans generally because term
extension is very favorable to the U.S.’s export market. In
addition, the extra income earned by the copyright industries
domestically and from foreigners might provide a significant
source of tax revenue for the U.S. Government.196
Greater income for copyright industries also leads to the
subsidization of more works.197 A common criticism of the CTEA
is that it provides no additional incentives to create when applied
to works already created.198 However, this ignores the reality that
often the copyright is not held by the creator, but by a large
business in the copyright industry that can use the additional
profits to subsidize more works.199
The film industry provides a useful example. The existence of
the specialty divisions of major studios, such as Sony Pictures
Classics, Paramount Classics, Warner Independent, Focus
Features, and Fox Searchlight, depend upon the financing of the
195

See supra note 32; see also Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case for Copyright
Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 294 (2002) (“At the time of the CTEA’s passage,
the copyright industries accounted for almost six percent of the U.S. gross domestic
product. All together, the industries represented the nation’s largest or second largest
group of exporters. The CTEA’s retrospective portion is worth a great deal of money to
the copyright holders.”).
196
Conversation with Professor Hugh C. Hansen, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan.
2005).
197
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 12–13 (1996).
198
See supra text accompanying notes 65–66.
199
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 12–13 (1996); supra note 35.
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major studios.200 Films in these divisions “chase after relatively
small returns,” despite, in recent years, receiving much critical
acclaim.201 As opposed to profitability, they exist, in part, to
satisfy “the desire of actors and directors to pursue challenging and
artistically satisfying work.”202 As stated by Tom Bernard, copresident of Sony Pictures Classics, “‘We’ve found pockets within
these large companies where there is an interest in this kind of
freedom and creativity.’”203 Greater profits for the major studios
should ensure that these valuable artistic ventures continue to be
funded.
There are some more subtle benefits to copyright term
extension as well. William Landes and Richard Posner have
observed that “the need to invest in intellectual property to
maximize its value is not exhausted in the initial creation of the
property. Investment is necessary to maintain the value of the
property as well, and also to resurrect abandoned or otherwise
unexploited intellectual property.”204 This investment will often
not occur in the absence of copyright protection.205 Two examples
involve the “tragedy of the commons” and incentive to undertake
risks.
Term extension avoids the “tragedy of the commons.”206 “[I]n
the absence of property rights, [a] pasture would be overgrazed
because none of the users would take account of the cost that his
use imposed on the other users by making their cattle graze more
to obtain the same amount of food.”207 In other words, the value of
a public good such as intellectual property could be reduced by
consumption beyond the efficient level.208 If, hypothetically,
advertisers could freely use the image of Humphrey Bogart, it is
200

A.O. Scott, The Invasion of the Midsize Movie, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at E1.
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 491 (2003).
205
Id.
206
Id. at 484–89.
207
Id. at 484.
208
“Overgrazing” problems are recognized in trademark law and increasingly in the law
of publicity rights. See id. at 485.
201
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possible that the image could become worthless through overexposure, confusion, or tarnishment.209 An example in copyright
involves the Walt Disney Company, which exerts care to protect
the appeal and marketability of its copyrighted characters by not
over-exposing them.210 Copyright term extension may increase the
social value211 of these characters.
Property rights—through term extension—can also increase the
amount of works on the market in another way. In the absence of
property rights, even public domain publishers will hesitate to
publish all but the most popular public domain books.212 If a
publisher expects that one out of five obscure public domain books
it releases will be commercially successful, and other publishers
can free ride on the risk-taking by just releasing the one successful
book, then the risk-taking publisher will not be able to recoup the
expenses of releasing all five books.213 The absence of property
rights may actually inhibit the publication of books.
Other benefits to the CTEA, as evidenced by the legislative
history, include harmonization with Europe, protection covering
the author and two succeeding generations, and incentive to restore
or digitize works.214

209

Id. at 486.
Id. Landes and Posner also name the works of Shakespeare as a counterexample. See
id. at 488. Epstein would likely view this counterexample as the rule, not the exception:
There are countless, often perverse, versions of Shakespeare that are produced
everywhere today. The Shakespeare trust would probably not license some of
these performances at all. Further, the trust would charge a hefty fee for the
standard performances that they did license, and could easily place tight
restrictions on the choice of sets, designs, actors and the like. Anyone is hard
pressed to believe that Shakespeare’s star has been dimmed by the calamities
committed in his name, or that the world would be a better place if the obvious
restrictions on use could be achieved with the blessing of the state.
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright
Law 35 (Apr. 2004) (Working Paper No. 204), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.
211
The social value equals the sum of the value to producers and the value to
consumers.
212
Landes & Posner, supra note 204, at 488–89.
213
Id. at 489.
214
See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text.
210
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ii. Costs
The costs to consumers of public domain materials do not
always vary significantly from the prices of copyright protected
material. “The legal monopoly conferred by a copyright . . . need
not translate itself into an economic monopoly so long as there are
close substitutes, as there are for every new popular song that is
released.”215 Moreover, for works other than those posted in
digital form on the Internet, many will entail similar costs in
bringing them to the market, regardless of copyright protection.
Books will still have to be printed, delivered, and sold through
retail chains, at a profit to the publisher.216 Theatrical productions
will still require the costs of actors, venue, advertising, technical
crew, set design, costumes, make-up, etc.
There is also “deadweight loss” involved—the loss resulting
from the consumers who would consume at the public domain
publisher’s price, but not at the copyright–protected price217—but
“because the scope of copyright protection is . . . very narrow, the
size of the deadweight loss is likely to be relatively small. The
narrower the scope of a property right, the more good substitutes
there are, the less the owner’s monopoly power is, therefore, and
so the smaller is the deadweight loss that the monopoly creates.”218
The distinction between whether the creation is in the public
domain or not is more critical for creators who want to make
derivative works. Copyright protection increases the costs for the
derivative creator because he or she must undertake the
expenditures of tracking down the copyright holder and negotiating
a license.219 However, the plight of the derivative user should not
be too distressing. Even with the CTEA, the idea/expression
dichotomy, scenes à faire, and fair use doctrine provide much for a
creator to draw from, apart from the works that are already in the
public domain. “The lost use involved is of little consequence for
any dynamic development of the arts, which need not be the case

215
216
217
218
219

Epstein, supra note 210, at 30–31.
The sale of books would be analogous to the sale of sound recordings or films.
Landes & Posner, supra note 204, at 480–81.
Id. at 481.
See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
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in patents.”220 As for the tracking costs, though they are increased
by the CTEA,221 the CTEA is not the real culprit. Registration is
the remedy; term lengths do not need to be reduced.222
iii. Result
Although Lessig has concluded that “[a]ny wealth [the CTEA]
creates for copyright holders is swamped by the wealth the public
loses in lower costs and wider access,”223 this statement masks the
complexity of interests at stake. Lessig considers neither the
benefits that the CTEA provides the public as consumer,224 nor the
benefits for other beneficiaries, such as the U.S. Government and
the American worker.225 To determine whether the CTEA is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, further economic analyses on the
magnitude of the above-mentioned costs and benefits would be
required. Nevertheless, this Note opines that the CTEA is KaldorHicks efficient, particularly because the net harm to the public is
likely to be small given that the losses are circumscribed by
copyright’s incomplete monopoly power and the availability of
substitutes, and the benefits are not inconsequential: increased
exports, taxes, jobs, and subsidization of new works.
c) Should There Be a Different Outcome if the Legislature
Is Self-Interested?
Under the self-interested government model, a remedy for
public domain publishers is justifiable even if the CTEA meets the
220

Epstein, supra note 210, at 31. “No one has to use any particular song or story for a
particular project, but can draw on a rich culture, including items that have fallen out of
copyright protection. In contrast, it is quite difficult to conduct research on breast cancer
unless one has access to the BRAC-I gene.” Id.
221
See supra note 88.
222
Advocating indefinitely renewable copyright, Landes and Posner observe: “It is not
perpetual property rights but the absence of registration that creates prohibitive tracing
costs.” Landes & Posner, supra note 204, at 477.
223
Lawrence Lessig, They’re Not Worthy: Why Extend the Copyright on Works that No
Longer Have Commercial Value?, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.01/view.html?pg=5 (Jan. 2005).
224
See supra notes 197–203 (subsidization of new works), 206–11 (avoiding the
“tragedy of the commons”), and 212–13 (increasing the release of works already created),
and accompanying text.
225
See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (discussing jobs, taxes, and trade
balance).
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Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test, because the government there does
not seek to distribute benefits equally in the long run.226 Lessig,
citing political contributions, argues that legislative self-interest
influenced the passage of the CTEA,227 but his concept of selfinterest is too expansive, encompassing activities fully consistent
with the First Amendment right to petition.228 Whether Epstein’s
definition of self-interest includes Lessig’s “self-interest” is
unclear,229 but irrelevant—no court would be persuaded that there
should be a remedy for the “losers” in a change in law just because
lobbying exists. Were a court to decide otherwise, every legislator
would be deemed self-interested, and the ability to create new laws
would be crippled by the need to provide remedies for all the
“losers.”230 This is unworkable. As a result, the self-interested

226

See supra Part II.A.1.c.i.
See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 216–18 (“[Extending copyright terms] is lucrative for
Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of
money to see their copyright terms extended. . . . [T]his is the core of the corruption in
our present system of government. ‘Corruption’ not in the sense that representatives are
bribed. Rather, ‘corruption’ in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries of
Congress’s acts to raise and give money to Congress to induct it to act. . . . In the
lobbying that led to the passage of the [CTEA], this ‘theory’ about incentives was proved
real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the [CTEA] in the House received the
maximum contribution from Disney’s political action committee; in the Senate, eight of
the twelve sponsors received contributions. The RIAA and MPAA are estimated to have
spent over $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more than
$200,000 in campaign contributions. Disney is estimated to have contributed more than
$800,000 to reelection campaigns in the 1998 cycle.”).
228
Notably Lessig does not allege that any illegal activity took place. See id.
229
See supra note 192.
230
See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright
Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J.
2331, 2407 (2003) (“[The Lessig] view would be that, because of the economic power of
certain corporations and because of the importance they attached to the CTEA, a
congressional majority adopted a statute not in the majority’s interest and that the Court
should therefore closely scrutinize the resulting legislation. This is a formula that, if
generally applied would give courts a roving commission to overturn legislation that they
deem not in the public interest. One does not have to be a cynic (or a public choice
theorist) to recognize that powerful economic interest account for a great deal of
legislation. The amount of congressional legislation and the amount of legislation
adopted by states that could be analogized to [Lessig’s] approach to the CTEA is
astonishing. If courts aggressively review economic legislation that seems to favor
powerful special interest, they must aggressively review much—and perhaps most—
economic legislation.”).
227
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government model should not create any remedies not available
under the “virtuous but fallible government” model.
d) Does Any Law Support these Results? Would Such
Laws Be Advisable?
Even if it could be proven that the CTEA is not Kaldor-Hicks
efficient, there is presently no law supporting remedies for
inefficient changes in laws. This is not surprising: exacting
scrutiny would severely inhibit lawmaking and create substantial
uncertainty over passed laws.231 In addition, providing remedies,
such as compensation, grandfathering, or striking down the
changes, may be prohibitively complicated.232
With economic legislation in particular, there are important
reasons to defer to Congress. The first is that courts are not wellequipped to evaluate this type of legislation.233 “Courts are poorly
positioned to gather and assess the data needed to evaluate
economic decisions, and . . . if the Court guesses wrong about the
consequences, the very nature of constitutional adjudication makes
it difficult to shift course.”234 The second is that our government
relies upon majority decision-making for its legitimacy.235 This
process should only be interrupted if there is a flaw, the most
common example being when discrete and insular minorities are
targeted.236 Stricter scrutiny is justified here because these
individuals do not have adequate representation.237 In contrast,
“economic legislation is the paradigmatic example of the type of
legislation that courts should not scrutinize closely. Economic
legislation is the product of trade-offs made by interest groups.
Except in exceptional circumstances, courts should not upset the
resulting bargained-for deals.”238

231

Id.
See Epstein, supra note 177, at 76; supra text accompanying note 194.
233
See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 230, at 2407.
234
Id.
235
See id. at 2401 (crediting John Hart Ely for the political process rationale for judicial
deference discussed here).
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
232
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As a result, even if economic theory justifies a remedy for the
plaintiffs (which it likely does not), such a finding should not
advance the plaintiff’s case—not only does there not exist any
cause of action embracing such a theory, but the importance of
deferring to Congress on economic legislation recommends that a
finding of economic inefficiency should not be persuasive even as
a policy argument.
III. SECOND CLAIM: THE CTEA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
BECAUSE THE ABSENCE OF RENEWAL PROVISIONS RESULTS IN
WORKS BEING LOCKED-UP, REGARDLESS OF THE PREFERENCES OF
THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER
A. Does the CTEA Tie the Hands of the Copyright Holder?
Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the
works from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing
commercial value. The real harm of term extension comes
not from these famous works. The real harm is to the
works that are not famous, not commercially exploited, and
no longer available as a result.239
This harm that Lessig speaks of could be ameliorated if the
copyright holder was able to release his work into the public
domain at his own will, or broadly advertise that certain uses will
be permitted for free. However, contrary to Lessig’s claim, the
absence of renewal provisions does not entirely foreclose these
options from the copyright holder. Specifically, a copyright holder
can choose to abandon his work if he wants it to enter the public
domain, or license certain (or all) uses of his work, for free.
Lessig’s own Creative Commons substantially facilitates both of
these processes.
Should a copyright holder decide to abandon his copyright, he
must engage in “an overt act evidencing such an intent.”240
239

See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 221–27.
See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 13.06 (2003) (stating that there is “strong
authority holding than an overt act evidencing such an intent is necessary to establish
abandonment”).
240
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Although the caselaw in this area is not particularly welldeveloped, authors have been held to establish an intent to abandon
by implying that their work was in the public domain when others
requested to use it,241 and by widely distributing their work without
a copyright notice and not policing infringement.242 In addition,
the Copyright Office will aid a copyright owner in effecting
abandonment by recording an affidavit expressing the copyright
holder’s desire to abandon the copyright, and requesting return of
the Certification of Registration.243
Of course, even without abandonment, a copyright holder
could retain his copyright and decide to license his work for free to
individuals and organizations of his choice, for certain uses of his
choice. This process is made even simpler with the Creative
Commons244 because the Creative Commons provides a variety of
simple licenses for the creator to choose from,245 and it also
provides a central location for content users to see what works and
uses are available.246 This cuts down significantly on the
transaction costs of the content provider and the content seeker.
The process of choosing a license is fairly easy; the copyright
owner merely answers a few questions, such as what uses are
permitted, whether attribution is required, and whether
modifications are permitted.247 The process is intentionally simple,
so that the copyright owner can do it himself, without the
assistance of a lawyer.248 And if the copyright holder wants to go
241

Id. § 13.06 & n.12.1 (citing Sanga Music, Inc. v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 55
F.3d 756 (2d Cir. 1995)).
242
Id. § 13.06 & n.15 (citing Stuff v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 342 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1965)).
243
See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices ch. 1603.02
(1998) (“Any other document, including . . . an abandonment of copyright . . . will be
recorded in the Copyright Office . . . .”), at http://www.copyright.gov/compendium/1600.htm; BERNARD C. DIETZ, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION PRAC. § 24:27 (2003)
(describing the assistance of the Copyright Office in effecting abandonment).
244
For a discussion of the Creative Commons, see LESSIG, supra note 5, at 282–86.
245
See Choose License, at http://creativecommons.org/license (last visited Mar. 27,
2005) (offering a choice of licenses for authors).
246
See Get Content, at http://creativecommons.org/getcontent (last visited Mar. 27,
2005) (providing a search engine and directories of works protected by Creative
Commons licenses).
247
See Choose License, at http://creativecommons.org/license (last visited Mar. 27,
2005).
248
See generally LESSIG, supra note 5, at 282–86.
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so far as to relinquish all rights, and dedicate it to the public
domain, he may accomplish that as well with the Creative
Commons, by selecting “Public Domain Dedication.”249
As for works that authors do not want to license for free, i.e.
those with enduring commercial value, there could still be the
problem of these works being locked-up if the copyright holder
cannot be located. This is a problem that exists under any
copyright regime and is probably exacerbated by extended
terms.250 Nevertheless, it is not true that such works are locked-up
regardless of the preferences of copyright holders, because a
proactive copyright holder who wishes to remain accessible can
take actions such as registering his copyright,251 updating such
registration,252 placing notice of copyright on copies of his work,253
and recording transfers.254
B. Other Reasons Why the Claim Should Fail
As demonstrated in the section above, the facts do not support
Lessig’s claim that works are locked-up regardless of the
preferences of copyright holders. Although the various methods
available for relinquishing full copyright protection and increasing
accessibility to potential licensees should be sufficient to defeat
Lessig’s claim, there are other reasons why it is likely to fail: the
existence of the CTEA infringement exception, the pending
249
See Public Domain Dedication, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain
(last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
250
See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 251 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o some extent
[permission costs] accompany any copyright law, regardless of the length of the
copyright term. But to extend that term . . . will dramatically increase the size of the
costs . . . .”).
251
See 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2004) (copyright registration generally); 17 U.S.C. § 409
(2004) (application procedures).
252
See 17 U.S.C. § 408(d) (2004) (enabling the Register to permit a copyright holder to
“correct an error in a copyright registration or to amplify the information given in a
registration”).
253
See 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2004) (permitting “a notice of copyright as provided by this
section [to] be placed on publicly distributed copies”).
254
See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2004) (“Any transfer of copyright ownership or other
document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the
document filed for recordation bears the actual signature of the person who executed it,
or if it is accompanied by a sworn or official certification that it is a true copy of the
original, signed document.”).
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“Public Domain Enhancement Act,” and the minimal amount of
harm at stake.
1. The CTEA’s Infringement Exception
The CTEA itself has an infringement exception that permits
libraries and archives to “reproduce, distribute, display, or
perform” certain works during the last twenty years of copyright
protection, “for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research”
if after “reasonable investigation” it is found that they are neither
“subject to normal commercial exploitation” nor attainable at a
reasonable price.255 This provision directly addresses Lessig’s
concern over the orphan works problem, i.e. that unprofitable
works will become unavailable during the copyright period.256
Notably, Lessig was silent about the “library exception” in the
Kahle complaint, even though it goes to the heart of the policy
problems he is concerned about.257 He certainly could have at least
argued that it would be inconsequential, as Justice Breyer did in his
Eldred dissent, claiming that the uncertain bounds of the “library
exception” would render it useless.258 Perhaps Lessig would have
been wiser to put his efforts into litigating cases that would clarify
the exception (and possibly generate favorable judge-made law)
instead of litigating the flaccid Golan and Kahle.
2. The Public Domain Enhancement Act
The pending “Public Domain Enhancement Act”259 could
strike the balance Lessig desires without invalidating the CTEA.260
255
See 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2004); supra note 59 (explaining the statute and Congress’s
rationale).
256
See supra note 239 and accompanying text (quote by Lessig that he is primarily
concerned about unprofitable works). But see supra note 90 (argument by Justice Breyer
that the coverage of the infringement exception is too limited and its “reasonable
investigation” requirement is too vague).
257
See generally Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Kahle v. Ashcroft (C
04-1127 BZ), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml.
258
See supra note 90.
259
Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003).
260
On the website for the Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society (of
which Lessig is the founder), it is noted that if the PDEA were passed, Kahle might not
be necessary. Yet it is also observed that the PDEA has not received much favor in
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The act, if passed, would reinstate copyright renewal.261 Copyright
holders would lose their copyright after fifty years of protection
unless they pay $1.262 Thereafter, the copyright holder would have
to renew every ten years.263 Copyright owners of valuable
copyrights (in addition to any other diligent and determined
copyright holder) would be able to enjoy the entire period of
copyright protection under the CTEA. Those who have only a
minimal economic interest in their copyright, and are unmotivated
to either renew or affirmatively abandon,264 will have their works
enter the public domain.
The “Public Domain Enhancement Act” would allow Congress
to remedy some of the CTEA’s undesirable effects without
jeopardizing the entire CTEA. Given the level of deference paid to
Congress in Eldred265 and the Supreme Court’s holding in favor of
the CTEA, a court would probably be disinclined to overturn the
entire CTEA for a limited adverse effect266 (which arguably does
not exist).267 Instead, it would likely be persuaded to allow
Congress to address the issue, if it wishes to.
3. The Amount of Harm at Stake Is Minimal
The ultimate harm to the public is likely to be minor if “lockedup” works do not reach the public domain until the end of the
copyright term. One reason is that the works, if not profitable to

Congress thus far. See Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, Kahle v.
Ashcroft Case Page, at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/kahle_v_ashcroft.shtml
(last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
261
Id.
262
Id. On top of the fifty years, there would be a six month grace period in which the
copyright holder could pay the $1 fee without incurring copyright expiration. Id.
263
Id. A six month grace period exists if payment is not made by the end of ten years.
Id.
264
See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 137, 161 n.107 (1993) (suggesting that a copyright holder would lack the
motivation to record an abandonment of copyright).
265
Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (“[W]e find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this
order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”).
266
This is specifically referring to the argument that works are locked-up regardless of
the preferences of copyright holders.
267
See supra Part III.A.
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publish (especially with the declining costs and the increasing
possibilities made available by computers and the internet), are
likely to be quite esoteric.268 Another reason is that if anyone has
an interest in the work, it will probably not be lost.269 Fans will
publish copyrighted works on the internet regardless of legality.270
The third reason addresses concerns over derivative uses, and
suggests that cultural advancement will not be unduly slowed
down if users cannot appropriate works before the full copyright
period runs out. The “critics [of control, e.g. Lessig] understate—
perhaps dramatically—the contribution that even ‘perfect’ control
of intellectual creations makes to the public domain.”271 To
construe the public domain merely as unprotected works
unnecessarily trivializes the manifestly important effects of
protected works on culture.272 Consider, for instance, a novel by
Hemingway or Faulkner. Aside from the cultural enrichment and
pleasure that the general reader can get from such a novel, a writer
learns priceless lessons about writing style. These contributions to
the public domain are immensely more valuable than what one can
accomplish by copying verbatim large sections of the original
work. Likewise, any fan of music knows how much musicians
love to talk about their influences. Musicians learn a lot merely
from listening to protected recordings of other musicians and
legally can apply elements of style to their own music. In general,
there is a lot to “borrow” that is non-infringing.
In sum, not only does Lessig’s argument fail on the facts—
because copyright holders can choose to release their works into
the public domain, and take measures to increase accessibility to

268

For a list of orphan works submitted by the public to help the Kahle plaintiffs, see
Kahle v. Ashcroft Submission Site, at http://notabug.com/kahle (last visited Mar. 27,
2005). Note however that some of the works are clearly not orphaned, but rather
unreleased due to the copyright holder’s preferences.
269
See Kevin Kelly, Making My Own Music, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at A21
(explaining how fans have played an enormous role in digitizing music, books, and
films).
270
Id. They can also cheaply store them on their hard drives.
271
R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 997 (2003).
272
Cf. id. at 1010 (“[E]ven fully ‘propertized’ intellectual goods will nonetheless
contribute, perhaps significantly, to the growth of open information.”).
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potential licensees—but there are also no other substantial
justifications to incline a court to find otherwise.
IV. THE SHADOW OF ELDRED
This Note predicts that both claims—that the effect of the
CTEA is unconstitutional because (i) the extended copyright terms
are overly burdensome on those who publish public domain works
and (ii) the absence of renewal provisions results in works being
locked-up, regardless of the preferences of the copyright holders—
will fail. Neither argument is persuasive, especially when
analyzed against the backdrop of Eldred. In Eldred, numerous
arguments against the constitutionality of the CTEA were
made273—but to no avail. As one of Lessig’s opponents said, “In
Eldred, they didn’t just focus on the limited times argument; they
threw in everything and the kitchen sink.”274 With these
arguments, the petitioners did not just lose. They lost decisively.
They lost at the District Court level,275 they lost in the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals,276 and finally, they lost in the U.S. Supreme
Court.277 Moreover, seven of nine Supreme Court Justices voted
against the petitioners.278 With rational basis scrutiny, as long as
the low standard of rationality is met, it is immaterial whether
petitioners’ arguments and policy considerations outweigh those of
Congress.279 Given Lessig’s utter failure previously to persuade
the Supreme Court that the CTEA is unconstitutional, any court
subsequently looking at the effects of the CTEA likely will not be
prone to side with Lessig. His lack of success in Golan and Kahle
confirm this.280
273

See supra Part I.C–D.
Krause, supra note 4, at 41 (quoting Fritz Attaway, Executive Vice President and
Washington General Counsel of the Motion Picture Association of America).
275
Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting summary judgment for
defendants); see supra note 39.
276
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see supra notes 40–41.
277
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003).
278
See id.
279
See id. at 208 (“[W]e find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty
to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order,
however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”).
280
See supra Parts I.E.2, I.F.3.
274
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In what may be a mix of strategy and delusion,281 Lessig
blames himself for losing Eldred and dissects his performance to
see where he went wrong.282 Ultimately, however, his assertion
that the case could and should have been won does not undermine
the authority of Eldred.283 In trying to pinpoint errors that he
made,284 he fails to see the bigger picture. The Supreme Court
addressed many arguments on the constitutionality of the CTEA
and was presented with numerous briefs that addressed the policy
ramifications of the CTEA. Lessig did not lose because he made a
few missteps during oral arguments.
The Eldred decision casts a shadow; this Note posits that there
will be a presumption against Lessig in arguments invoking the
CTEA. So far, this has been borne out in Golan and Kahle.
CONCLUSION
Even with the uncertainty of litigation, Lessig likely would lose
on both of the claims analyzed in this Note. The claim over the
hardship faced by public domain publishers will not prevail
because this loss was completely anticipated in Eldred and takings
law requires an injury to property, which was absent here.
Moreover, their losses are not compelling enough to justify a
radical upgrade of takings law, especially upon a theory equating
lobbying with self-interest and encouraging the Court to scrutinize
economic legislation. The claim that works will be locked-up,
regardless of the preferences of copyright holders, also fails
because it is factually incorrect with the existence of the Creative
Commons, abandonment, registration, and the ability to record
transfers.
The foregoing does not mean that Lessig’s efforts in Eldred
have not been valuable. His battle against copyright term
281

It is strategic in the sense that if he wants to reargue the case, he has to claim that the
case could have been won. But he is also delusional if he ignores all of the arguments
that he and his amici made and instead blames defeat on what he believes were a few
sub-optimal answers that he made in oral argument. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 238–41.
282
See id. at 236–41.
283
Id. at 229.
284
Id. at 236–41.
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extension has raised public awareness of important copyright
issues. As a result, it is now highly unlikely that Congress would
attempt further increase copyright terms. In addition, the Creative
Commons and the Public Domain Enhancement Act (if passed)
will help to replenish the public domain, therefore accomplishing,
to an extent, Lessig’s goals.

